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GROUNDED THEORY’S BEST KEPT SECRET: THE ABILITY TO BUILD 
THEORY  
Abstract 
While the power and influence of GTM as a qualitative research method in all academic disciplines 
continues to evolve and grow, the original intent of the founding fathers to build theory, and build it 
ambitiously, across and over different data sets and settings, seems to be rarely discussed in the 
literature. In particular, the recommendations from Glaser and Strauss in their 1967 Discovery book 
about building formal theory from substantive theory are rarely referenced.  This chapter discusses 
how best to consider the recommendations from Glaser and Strauss with regard to not only building 
theory by minimising and maximising group differences, but by also considering the diversity or 
similarity of concepts within similar or dissimilar groups. An example of how such movements from 
substantive to formal theory might proceed is discussed, in order to explore and demonstrate those 
ideas in depth. The grounded theory approach to theory building is contrasted and critiqued against 
more mainstream ideas about theory building in various disciplines, and the debates about theory 
that exist in many applied disciplines.  Finally, this chapter discusses how grounded theorists can 
actively take up these ideas within their own academic disciplines. 
Keywords: Substantive and formal theory, maximising and minimising group differences, diversity 
and similarity of concepts in theory building, theory in academic disciplines 
 









As a lifelong passionate adherent of grounded theory method (GTM), and having watched GTM 
become more and more popular, and relevant, in a range of academic disciplines, I have one 
outstanding question. Why is it that the recommendations of Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) for moving from substantive to formal theory are not more widely discussed? If we take as our 
starting point Glaser and Strauss’s definition of substantive theory, which is one developed for a 
substantive, or empirical area of enquiry, it is clear that the majority of theories generated using 
GTM fall into this definition. Why is it that we do not then attempt to build formal theory, which 
Glaser and Strauss define as one developed for a formal, or conceptual area of enquiry? Especially as 
Glaser and Strauss point out that substantive and formal theories exist on distinguishable levels of 
generality, and that each type can shade at points into the other? 
Given an ongoing concern about theory building in many newer academic disciplines (Weber 2003, 
Lester 2005, Oswick, Fleming et al. 2011, Johnson, Ekstedt et al. 2012), which centre on those 
disciplines’ ability to build formal theory, it seems timely to examine this question in more detail, 
and to explore GTM’s undoubted contribution to a larger theory building effort in academic 
disciplines. While some social sciences have a long history of abstract theorizing eg Stinchcombe 
(1991), many newer disciplines do not. Even in those disciplines, the advice of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) with regard to theoretical sampling, looking at dissimilar and similar groups with unsaturated 
and saturated categories, seems rarely acted upon, presumably because of some difficulties 
operationalizing the advice. I remain convinced that this advice gives us valuable guidance when 
building theory, because it gives us advice on extending the scope and generality of a theory, which 
in turn can lead us to building bigger, more formal theories. 
The rest of this chapter looks at theory building debates in the newer academic disciplines, and 
considers GTMs contribution to the idea of theory. I then look at Glaser and Strauss’s (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967) recommendations about theory building in detail, with special reference to minimising 
and maximising group differences.  What might those recommendations tell us in 2017? What might 
we learn when we apply those recommendations? 
Theory, and Grounded Theory 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) set  out the role of theory in sociology as both enabling prediction and 
explanation of behaviour, and also as ‘being readily understandable to sociologists  of any viewpoint, 
to students and to significant laymen’. They also state that the theory needs to be clear enough to 
be operationalised in quantitative studies where appropriate. They were also concerned with issues 
of fit of the theory, by which they meant that the theory must be able to explain the phenomena, 
and not be forced on to the phenomena as an explanation. Above all, they pointed out that enduring 
theories are based on data, are grounded in that data, and cannot easily be refuted (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967).They also made the important point that how theories are assessed is also dependent 
on how the theory was generated. 
If we fast forward to recent debates about theory in management, and in information systems, we 
see some similar themes. For instance, Corley and Gioia (2011) are as concerned with the utility of a 
management theory as its originality. Oswick, Fleming et al. (2011) wonder if theory borrowing from 
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other disciplines constrains the development of new and indigenous theories. This also raises issues 
of fit of those borrowed theories, and whether those theories are adequately grounded in data from 
their home discipline.  In software engineering, the question has been raised about the absence of 
theories in the discipline (Johnson, Ekstedt et al. 2012), and the utility of theories to the discipline. 
In information systems, a lively debate about the importance of theory to the discipline occurred in 
2014. Avison and Malaurent (2014) railed against what they saw as a fetishing of theory in the 
discipline, the fact that various theories fell in and out of favour, and again, raised questions about 
the fit of borrowed theories. Their piece was accompanied by several commentaries from Lee 
(2014), Markus (2014), and (Gregor 2014). One striking agreement among the commentaries was 
that there was indeed a lack of consensus about what a theory is.  
Overall then, we see in these debates a lack of consensus about what theory is, and also a concern 
about the fit of theories imported from older reference disciplines. While the first is probably 
attributable to the newness of some of these disciplines, it is interesting to note that there are also 
concerns about fit and groundedness of theories, whether imported from outside the discipline (fit), 
or groundedness (within the discipline). 
 Gregor (2006) is quoted in a number of these debates, and her definition of theory bears repeating 
here because it is both broad and helpful. She defines theories as ‘abstract entities that aim to 
describe, explain, and enhance understanding of the world and in some cases, to provide predictions 
of what will happen in the future and to give a basis for intervention and action.’(p.616). She further 
categorises theories into those that analyse and describe (but do not contain causal relationships), 
theories for explanation (but with no testable propositions), theories for prediction (testable 
propositions but no causal explanations), and theories for both explanation and prediction. She also 
adds theories for design and action, which can be seen as more specific to information systems and 
software engineering. 
Gregor also defines the components of all theories as containing a means of representation, 
constructs, statements of relationship, and scope. It is useful to consider how these conventional 
components compare to the grounded theory process of theory building, simply because it seems 
rarely that grounded theory is discussed in the same way as theory in general – yet the components 
are the same, as the table below comparing Gregor’s components to GTM indicates. 
Theory Component Definition In Grounded Theory 
Means of representation The theory must be represented 
physically in some way: in words, 
mathematical terms, symbolic 
logic, diagrams, tables or 
graphically.  
Theories in GTM are often 
represented by a narrative 
framework, diagrams or 
statements of hypotheses 
Constructs These refer to the phenomena of 
interest in the theory (Dubin’s 
“units”). All of the primary 
constructs in the theory should 
be well defined. Many different 
types of constructs are possible: 
for example, observational (real) 
terms, theoretical (nominal) 
terms and collective terms.  
In GTM, the aim is to get to one 
to two core categories or 
constructs. This makes for a 
more parsimonious and coherent 
theory. All the constructs in a 
grounded theory are grounded in 
data, which can be equated to 
observational (real) terms. 
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Statements of relationship These show relationships among 
the constructs. Again, these may 
be of many types: associative, 
compositional, unidirectional, 
bidirectional, conditional, or 
causal. The nature of the 
relationship specified depends on 
the purpose of the theory. Very 
simple relationships can be 
specified: for example, “x is a 
member of class A.” 
In GTM, because the theory is 
often (but not always) based on 
qualitative data, relationships are 
not often described in 
mathematical terms. There is a 
lot of guidance in GTM about the 
sort of relationships that are 
possible between constructs, in 
the form of coding families 
(Glaser 1978) and a coding 
paradigm (Corbin and Strauss 
2008) 
Scope The scope is specified by the 
degree of generality of the 
statements of relationships 
(signified by modal qualifiers 
such as “some,” “many,” “all,” 
and “never”) and statements of 
boundaries showing the limits of 
generalizations. 
GTM aims to produce 
substantive theories which 
pertain to the area being 
investigated. The scope and 
generalisability can be extended 
by theoretical sampling (Glaser 
1978). The substantive theory 
can and should be engaged with 
existing theories – in grounded 
theory, existing theories can also 
be seen as slices of data which 
help build the theory. 
Table 1 - Comparing Gregor (2006) components to grounded theory building (Urquhart, 2013) 
A few points in the above table bear further discussion. First, and most importantly, the constructs in 
a grounded theory are grounded in data. Second, the founding fathers of grounded theory knew that 
a parsimonious theory was important – hence the recommendation that one or two ‘core’ 
categories (or constructs) should make up a grounded theory. This recommendation helps to raise 
the level of the theory and widen its potential scope. Third, grounded theories rarely have 
relationships described in mathematical terms, because they are grounded (usually)1 in qualitative 
data. That said, it is entirely possible to generate propositions about causal relationships in a 
grounded theory.  If we look at the range of academic theories available to us, there are many 
different relationships represented in theories. For instance, in structuration theory (Giddens 1984) 
posits that social systems are created and reproduced by an inseparable duality of structure and 
agency. Theories like structuration theory are of course precisely the sort of ‘grand’ armchair 
theories that Glaser and Strauss (1967) felt did not provide sufficient theory for new areas, or simply 
did not work. Interestingly, Giddens did not think that his theory should be used for guiding practice 
of research, but rather as a sensitising device, which is entirely reasonable, as it can be seen as a 
‘grand’ or formal theory2.  
                                                          
1 Glaser, B. G. and A. L. Strauss (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. 
New York, Aldine Publishing Company.and Glaser’s monograph on quantitative GT - Glaser, B. G. (2008). Doing 
Quantitative Grounded Theory, Mill Valley Press. (2008) state that grounded theories can be built from 
quantitative data. Walsh, I. (2014). "Using quantitative data in mixed-design grounded theory studies: an 
enhanced path to formal grounded theory in information systems." European Journal of Information Systems 
2014: 1-27., gives an interesting illustration of using quantitative GT in a grounded theory building process by 
means of cluster analysis in a mixed method study.   
2 That said, Giddens’ view of his own theory has been challenged by proponents of ‘strong’ structuration 
theory, in, for example, Stones, R. (2005). Structuration Theory. London, Palgrave. 
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This brings us to the final point in the table, which is the issue of scope. The inevitable consequence 
of a grounded theory is that it tends to be a substantive theory, pertaining to the area being 
investigated, because if the theory needs to be grounded in data, it will naturally limit the scope of 
the theory to what can be observed in a single study. It is this issue of scope – and the associated 
boundary conditions and context – that seem to be less discussed in the literature. While in the 
physical sciences, boundary conditions are typically solutions expressed as equations, in the social 
sciences, these conditions are more likely to be boundaries of race, gender and class – and the truly 
universal theories might transcend these boundaries (Spatz and Kardas 2008). Davison and 
Martinsons (2016) have discussed the issue of theory scope in information systems, asking to what 
extent are the findings of a study strictly limited to the original context, and the importance of 
boundary conditions.  Within grounded theory, there is a degree of clarity around the issue of scope, 
because it is clear that the scope of the theory can be extended by following the advice on 
theoretical sampling. The next sections look at Glaser and Strauss’s definitions of substantive and 
formal theory, then examine their recommendations on moving substantive theory to formal theory, 
using theoretical sampling. 
 
Defining Substantive and Formal Theory 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) define substantive theory as ‘that developed for a substantive, or 
empirical area of sociological inquiry’ (p.32). They define formal theory ‘that developed for a formal, 
or conceptual area of sociological inquiry’ (p.32). They are careful to say that both types of theory 
can be considered middle range, and are not all inclusive ‘grand theories’. Glaser and Strauss point 
out that substantive and formal theories only differ in terms of the degree of generality –  that is the 
scope of the theory. Formal theory is created by comparative analysis among different kinds of 
substantive cases. So, gradually the scope is increased, by different contexts and boundary 
conditions, represented by different substantive cases.   
They suggest that, for substantive theory, the theorist can select groups from the same substantive 
class, regardless of where they are found (p.53). They give the example of comparing an ‘emergency 
ward’ to all kinds of medical wards, in all kinds of hospitals, in all countries. If however one was to 
progress toward a formal theory, they suggest that it would be useful to see the emergency ward as 
a sub class of emergency organisations.  
So let us look more deeply at the definitions of substantive and formal theory. One key difference is 
that formal theory categories are not underpinned by high empirical content3, despite the fact that 
they have their origin in empirical data. For the purpose of this table, categories can also be seen as 
constructs, as defined by Gregor (2006 ).  In grounded theory, the aim is to get to one or two core 
categories for a parsimonious theory (Glaser 1978, Strauss 1987). This helps the researcher to get to 
a reasonable level of abstraction, and mitigates against having too many low level categories, 
sometimes an inevitable consequence of detailed line by line coding. Importantly, it helps the 
researcher to pull together and integrate the theory around one central concern. In turn, those core 
categories are underpinned by lower level categories that are firmly grounded in the data.  
 Substantive Theory Formal Theory 
                                                          
3 I am indebted to Udo Kelle for this insight, and for his very helpful comments on this chapter 
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Categories One to two core categories, 
underpinned by many instances in the 
data (high empirical content) 
Underpinned by very few instances in the 
data. The categories that help build those 
formal categories, however, are 
underpinned by data. The formal theory 
category or construct is usually abstract, 
eg structure, process, role, identity, 
network, social capital 
Relationships 
(Theoretical Codes) 
Ideas for the relationships come from 
coding families or other theories, in 
line with theoretical sensitivity. Those 
relationships are ‘grounded’ in the 
data, to the extent that they are 
evidenced in theoretical memos and 
write ups of the research 
Often the relationships or underlying 
mechanisms are unique – this is what 
distinguishes a formal theory. Again, the 
relationships or mechanisms will often be 
underpinned by empirics at the lower 
level. 
Scope Scope is limited to the substantive 
(empirical) area of enquiry and 
pertains to the area being investigated  
Scope is extended by comparative analysis 
between different types of substantive 
cases 
Table 2 Considering the differences between substantive and formal theory 
As the scope of a substantive theory is extended towards a formal one, category or construct names 
by necessity become simpler, and more abstract, because that construct has to apply to a large 
number of substantive cases.  
Relationships between constructs or categories in grounded theory are named ‘theoretical codes’ by 
Glaser (1978) in his famed book Theoretical Sensitivity. The idea of theoretical sensitivity, articulated 
in the 1967 book, is that the grounded theorist has to be sufficiently aware of theories and how they 
are constructed, in order to be able to construct their own. Glaser proposed 18 ‘coding families’ in 
Theoretical Sensitivity that give inspiration for relationships between categories. These families (now 
totalling 41, with the families proposed in Glaser (2005)) are themselves often inspired by how other 
theories conceptualise phenomena. A few examples of theoretical families are given below. 
Family  Comment 
The 6 C’s – Causes, Contexts, Contingencies, 
Consequences, Covariances and Conditions 
This basic coding family, together with family  5, 
the Strategy Family, was adapted by (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990) as their coding paradigm of ‘Causal 
Conditions, Context, Intervening Conditions, 
Action/Interaction Strategies and Consequences’ 
Process – Stages, staging, phases, phasing, 
progresssions, passages, gradations, transititions, 
steps, ranks, careers, ordering, trajectories, chains, 
sequencings etc 
Glaser remarks that a process should have at least 
two stages.  
The Dimension Family – Dimensions, elements, 
division, piece of, properties of, facet, slice, sector, 
portion, segment, part, aspect, section 
As Glaser says, the more we learn of a category, the 
more we see of its dimensions. Of all theoretical 
codes, this is one that all researchers are likely to 
use. It is also important to realise that, when 
theorising, that we can privilege one dimension 
over another – it can become a full blown category 
The Type Family – Type, form, kinds, styles, classes, 
genre 
Glaser says while dimensions divide up the whole, 
types show variation in the whole. So, for instance, 
you might have a number of styles of introducing a 
problem in a conversation 
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The Strategy Family – Strategies, Tactics, 
mechanisms, managed, way, manipulation, 
manoeuvrings, dealing with, handling, techniques, 
ploys, means, goals, arrangements, dominating, 
positioning  
The Strauss and Corbin (1990) coding paradigm 
seems to be a mixture of this family and the first 
family.  
Moment capture, when a quick intervention is 
critical to causing an optimal outcome, eg closing a 
deal 
This is a new theoretical code introduced in the 
2005 book 
Frames, which are excavated through discourse 
patterns and are socio cultural in nature 
Also in the 2005 book, and based on 
communication theory. 
 Causal family, a relative of the 6Cs family.  This 
includes several aspects 1) Bias random walk  2) 
Amplifying causal looping   3) conjectural causation  
4) repetitive causal reproductions 5) equifinality  6) 
reciprocal causation 7) Triggers 8) Causal paths 9) 
Perpetual causal looping 
(Glaser 2005) gives some interesting nuances of 
causation in this theoretical code. 
Bias random walk is where all variables are in a 
flux, ‘then on the introduction of a crucial variable.. 
then of a sudden all of the variables fall into 
organisation’  
 Amplifying causal looping , ‘where consequences 
become causes, and one sees either worsening or 
improving progressions or escalating severity’  
Conjectural causation, where it is not always easy 
to identify decisive causal combinations.  
Repetitive causal reproductions, when a repeated 
action keeps producing the same consequences 
 Equifinality, where no matter what the causes and 
paths, the same consequence will occur  
Reciprocal causation, where there is a similar 
interaction of effects or amplified causal looping. 
Triggers, which are sudden causes that set off a 
consequence or set of consequences 
Causal paths, used to intervene in changing or 
stopping a consequence 
Perpetual causal looping, a mathematical model, an 
ordered calculated growth of increased size based 
on a set temporal path 
Table 3 Examples of Theoretical Families from Glaser (1978, 2005), adapted from Urquhart (2013) 
Of course, there is also guidance on relating categories in the Straussian version of grounded theory. 
Strauss in 1987 proposed a coding paradigm of conditions, consequences, interactions, strategies 
and consequences, using a procedure he named ‘axial coding’. He says the purpose of this element 
of axial coding is to ‘hypothesise about conditions, consequences, interactions, strategies and 
consequences’, ie think about how the categories relate. Later, Strauss and Corbin (1990) published 
a further coding paradigm, which prompted the now famous dispute between Glaser and Strauss. It 
is interesting to note however, that the strictures about this paradigm moved from mandatory to 
optional, over time. The table below explains the evolution of the coding paradigm.  
Coding Paradigm Comment on evolving use of paradigm 
Conditions, consequences, interactions, strategies 
and consequences (Strauss 1987) 
In the 1987 book, it is clear that the coding 
paradigm is not an optional part of coding. 
Researchers are told to ‘follow the coding 
paradigm’ p. 81 
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Causal Conditions, Context, Intervening Conditions, 
Action/Interaction,  Strategies and Consequences 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990) 
In the 1990 book the paradigm is modified to 
include different types of conditions, and actions 
Conditions (causal, intervening, and contextual), 
Actions/Interactions (strategic or routine tactics), 
Consequences (immediate, cumulative, reversible, 
foreseen or unseen) (Strauss and Corbin 1998) 
In the 1998 book, conditions are clustered 
together, strategies are clustered under actions 
and consequences elaborated on. 
Conditions, interactions and emotions, 
consequences (Corbin and Strauss 2008) 
In the 2008 book, the paradigm loses its 
prominence and is presented as an optional 
analytic tool for novice researchers. That said, the 
conditional/consequence matrix, used in previous 
editions to think about relationships between 
micro and macro conditions, now has a more 
central place in coding. 
Table 4 The Evolving Nature of the Straussian Coding Paradigm (Adapted from Urquhart 2013) 
Moving to the question of scope, Glaser and Strauss (1967), distinguish between scope of the 
population covered  by the theory, and the conceptual level of the theory (p.52). So for a substantive 
theory, different groups would be selected of exactly the same substantive type – they give the 
example of federal bookkeeping departments. However, if the aim is to progress to formal theory, 
increasingly dissimilar – and larger – groups need to be selected. The key sentences in the 1967 book 
are as follows: 
‘when the sociologist’s purpose is to discover formal theory, he (sic) will definitely select dissimilar, 
substantive groups from the larger class, while increasing his theory’s scope. And he will also find 
himself comparing groups that seem to be non-comparable on the substantive level, but that on 
the formal level are conceptually comparable…For example, while fire departments and emergency 
wards are substantially dissimilar, their conceptual comparability is still readily apparent..it must be 
explained on a higher conceptual level.’ (p.54), (author’s emphasis) 
Clearly, Glaser and Strauss considered in great detail, from the beginning, the differences between 
substantive and formal theory, and how to move from one to the other, from a practical point of 
view. The next section discusses their recommendations for theoretical sampling, which are rarely 
discussed in the grounded theory literature, despite the undoubted insights they give us for the 
theory building process. 
Glaser and Strauss’s Recommendations for Building Theory using Theoretical 
Sampling 
It is very clear that Glaser and Strauss were engaged from the outset with practical considerations 
for building theory – for them, the key issue of what data to collect next was always controlled by 
the emerging theory. The great contribution of their chapter on theoretical sampling in the 1967 
book was their assertion that the selection of comparison groups gave control over two aspects of 
the developing theory – first, conceptual level, and second, population scope.  This is expressed in a 
table on p.58 of the chapter, reproduced in this section, that shows the consequences of minimizing 
and maximizing differences in groups, and considering the variations within the data of those 
groups. Obviously variations in the data are expressed by variations in categories. 
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For Glaser and Strauss, the purpose of selecting groups is not about comparisons between and inside 
substantive groups, useful though that may be. Their criteria are ‘theoretical purpose and relevance 
– not of structural circumstance’ (p.48).  
Glaser and Strauss also lay great stress on either maximising or minimising differences between 
groups to control ‘theoretical relevance’ (p.55) of data collection.  They also point out that this then 
has a bearing on categories. For instance, if a similar group is chosen, many more instances of a 
category will be collected, while important differences might be spotted not noticed in earlier data 
collection. This is important for establishing the properties of a particular category, and Glaser and 
Strauss suggest that these properties are established before differences in groups are maximised.  
When maximising differences between groups, data in a particular category will vary. This allows the 
researcher to think about the ‘strategic similarities’ between groups, which give the uniformities of 
scope within the theory. They state that maximising ‘brings out the widest possible coverage on 
ranges, continua, degrees, types, uniformities, variations, causes, conditions, consequences, 
probabilities of relationships, strategies, process, structural mechanisms, and so forth, all necessary 
for elaboration of the theory’ (p.57). We can see here too an early reference to theoretical coding 
(Glaser 1978) and a recognition that a widening of scope means that relationships between 
constructs have to be reconsidered. They summarise their recommendations in the following table: 
 
Group Differences Data on Category 
Similar                                                     Diverse 
Minimized Maximum similarity in data leads 
to: 
Verifying usefulness of category; 
Generating basic properties; 
Establishing a set of conditions 
for a degree of category. These 
can be used for prediction. 
Identifying/developing  
fundamental differences under 
which category and hypothesis 
vary 
Maximized Identifying/developing 
fundamental uniformities of 
greatest scope 
Maximum diversity in data 
quickly forces: 
dense developing of properties 
of  categories; integrating of 
categories and properties; 
delimiting scope of theory 
Table 5 Consequences of Minimizing and Maximizing Differences in Comparison Groups for Generation of Theory (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967, p.58) 
Another way of thinking about this table is that its key contribution falls into two areas. First, it helps 
us see that maximising differences between groups helps us extend the scope of the theory we are 
working on. Second, we can raise the conceptual level of our substantive theory by considering the 
categories themselves. In particular, we can consider the unsaturated categories in our analysis as a 
promising avenue to raise the conceptual level of the theory, by guiding us to more interesting 
groups. The fascinating thing about this table is that it draws attention not only to issues of scope, 
but issues of the data, as expressed by the categories themselves, and how considering categories 
can improve the quality and conceptual level of the theory. 
While Eisenhardt (1989) popularised theoretical sampling for  group differences, she did not 
consider theoretical sampling of concepts in the same way as suggested above. She however talked 
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about within case comparison based on categories, which can be seen as a variation of sampling for 
concepts in the data. The differences in strategy between grounded theorists and mainstream 
qualitative researchers can perhaps be seen as a consequence of different methodologies for theory 
building – Eisenhardt (1989) used cases, while grounded theory methodology relies upon slices of 
data. So, how might these recommendations for theoretical sampling, as suggested by Glaser and 
Strauss, be carried out? What happens if we try and follow what the table suggests? 
Enacting the Recommendations for Theoretical Sampling 
In Urquhart and Vaast (2012), I briefly discuss what Glaser and Strauss’s advice on theoretical 
sampling might mean in practice for generation of social media theory, and use the example of 
Facebook statuses. In this section, I expand in detail on that example, and the steps of theory 
building that I believe are implied by the table, in order for us to explore what can be learned from 
those recommendations.  
Glaser and Strauss state that, at the beginning of generating a substantive theory, differences should 
be minimised in comparative groups. We can choose to minimise or maximise differences in groups 
along several dimensions, such as age, country, language, political affiliation and so on. Maximising 
those differences helps use theorise on relationships, conditions, patterns, and mechanisms (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967, p. 57). In our Facebook example explained below, we may wish to look at slices of 
data from other on line sources, such as personal blogs, Twitter feeds, or how a person responds to 
other comments from people below the line (BTL) when commenting on a news article. The 
theoretical sampling and choice of data slices depends on how the theory develops.  It is important 
to realise that the motivations for theoretical sampling are theoretically motivated, it is not a 
question of simply verifying the category in various populations. How might we operationalise the 
advice from Glaser and Strauss on theoretical sampling, and how does it help the development of a 
theory? Each step in the example is cross referenced to Table 6 below. 
Step 0 
Let us imagine we are trying to understand how people use Facebook. Suppose we start with a 
group of individuals aged 18-25, based in the UK, who use Facebook. By coding their Facebook 
statuses, we can see that there are many instances of people actively managing their Facebook 
statuses. Those statuses are chosen, or curated, to give the best possible impression of that person’s 
life and circumstances. We draw this conclusion from the data because there are very few statuses 
that do not portray the status owner as someone who is successful, surrounded by friends, and 
enjoying travel. We decide to call this concept or code ‘curating’. At the same time, we notice 
another interesting, minority use of Facebook status – a very personalised status that seems to be 
aimed at only a few people who might understand it. This concept we choose to call ‘personalising’. 
At this point then, we have a choice whether to pursue the theory development via saturated or 
unsaturated concepts (Lehmann 2010). What should we do next?  
We can base our theoretical sampling on either ‘curation’ – what we could call maximum similarity 
in data, or ‘personalising’, what we could call a fundamental difference in the data as to how people 
approach their Facebook statuses. In this example we first choose to pursue the unsaturated 




We would then sample a new Facebook group, of the same age, 18-25, in the same country, for the 
unsaturated concept of Personalising. Thus group differences are minimised (it is a similar group) but 
we are pursuing diverse concepts in the data.  
Our slices of data would actively seek out statuses that are Personalising, for the purpose of learning 
more about this particular category. This will quickly fill out the category and help us understand 
how it might vary in different circumstances. Obviously, both ‘Curating’ and ‘Personalising’ could be 
subsumed into a higher level concept of, say, ‘Impression Management’ as the theory increases in 
scope, and we could probably expect new categories to emerge, which can be aspects of ‘Impression 
Management’. 
 
Group Differences Concepts in the Data 
Similar                                                     Diverse 
Minimized Maximum similarity in data leads 
to: 
Verifying usefulness of category; 
Generating basic properties; 
Establishing a set of conditions 
for a degree of category. These 




fundamental differences under 
which category and hypothesis 
vary 
Example – Sampling Facebook 









First stage of theory building  
 
STEP 0 
Improve the theory by 
theoretical sampling for 




   
Communicating to a few people 












 STEP 1 
These identified as aspects of a 
broader category called 
‘Impression Management’ 
 
Extend the scope of the theory 
further by sampling a different 











Maximum diversity in data 
quickly forces: 
dense developing of properties 
of  categories; integrating of 
categories and properties; 






Example – Sampling diverse 
Facebook population – different 
ages, different countries 
Managing of Facebook Status. 
(‘Impression Management’ 
consisting of ‘Curating’, 






Extend the scope of the theory 
further by considering new 
unsaturated concepts that 
emerge 
 
Sample for unsaturated 
concepts discovered in previous 
phase, to further extend the 
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             STEP 3 
Table 6 Example of Theory Building Using Glaser and Strauss's Recommendations for Comparison Groups 
Step 2 
We could then proceed to maximise group differences by sampling different age groups, and 
different countries, in order to deepen the theory and ‘identify the fundamental uniformities of 
greatest scope’. In this stage, we will be paying attention to the saturated concepts of curating, and 
possibly personalising. This will further fill out the category ‘Impression Management’, which 
consists, at present of curating and personalising, and perhaps other types of Impression 
management discovered in Step 1. So, depending on how the theory is developing and the different 
properties of ‘Impression Management’, it might be apposite to sample a Facebook group that is 
older, or the same age range in a different country, so see if the categories hold true in a different 
culture. We could also consider whether membership of various Facebook groups has any sway on 
Impression Management. Thus the theory is increasing in depth in this stage. Impression 
Management is also a category that is quite abstract, which in future, may help us toward a formal 
theory.  
Step 3 
Again, we would be sampling a different group to maximise group differences, but also considering 
further unsaturated concepts that have been discovered in Step 2, to delimit the theory and densify 
the theory.  At this stage, one could consider sampling slices of data not from Facebook but other 
online sources such as Twitter, or extending the age range further, or sampling more slices from 
people from various Facebook groups. Obviously, how those differences are maximised has a direct 
bearing on the theory development, and may also suggest new relationships between concepts. 
How the category of Impression Management is being filled out will suggests new avenues of 
theoretical sampling, until the theory is suitably densified and has adequate (theoretical) scope for 
the research purpose. 
Note that this example gives but one route through the table, and it is a matter of judgement of how 
one might proceed through the table – the choice is to maximise group differences immediately, or 
13 
 
pay attention to unsaturated concepts and deepening of the category while minimising group 
differences. My own preference is for the latter, as this seems to me the best way to deepen the 
theory by ensuring it is grounded in lots of instances from a similar group. It’s also important to note 
how, as we might proceed to a formal theory, the category becomes more abstract (in this example, 
‘Impression Management’) and not underpinned by empirical data, as this job is done by the lower 
level categories that underpin that more abstract category (in this example, ‘Curating’ and 
‘Personalising’, and no doubt many other categories). To me the contribution of this table is not only 
understanding that we can extend the scope of a theory by paying attention to like and unlike 
groups, but that our theoretical sampling can be guided by our categories.  
Levels and Scope of Theory 
 
The previous section discussed, in detail, the guidance available from Glaser and Strauss for theory 
building using similar and dissimilar groups.  It is helpful guidance, so, why is it not more known in 
the mainstream of qualitative research, and considered in numerous qualitative research textbooks 
consulted by graduate students? To me, the answer to this question resides in two places. First, in 
comparatively new disciplines like information systems and management, we are still unfamiliar with 
the process of theory building, and lack theoretical sensitivity, hence the debates on and lack of 
consensus on theory building in those two disciplines. Grounded theory is unique in how it 
encourages us to build theory systematically by use of constant comparison and theoretical sampling 
of groups. It also helps us understand, in detail, how theories shade into another from the 
substantive to the formal. So many of the newer disciplines lack deep appreciation for the structures 
of theories, conveyed in grounded theory by theoretical families and the coding paradigm, and by 
the idea of theory mechanisms in the social sciences.  
Second, by contrast, in the social sciences, there has been indeed a great deal of debate about the 
nature of theory, largely focused on mechanisms. However, a lot of current discussion on 
mechanisms tend to focus on opening up the black box, and work from higher levels of theory to 
lower ones4 to provide explanations. Davison and Martinsons (2016) complain about a rush to 
universalism in the information systems discipline, where theories borrowed from other reference 
disciplines are applied, regardless of the context of that application. They make a plea for the 
understanding and clear explication of boundary conditions when using theories, lest the context of 
the study be ignored.  My commentary on that article (Urquhart 2016), suggested that particularism 
vs universalism is a false dichotomy. Grounded theorists know that Glaser (1978) states that levels of 
theory shade into one another as a theory becomes more and more abstracted, from substantive to 
formal. Stinchcombe (1991) was keenly aware of the issue of levels of theory when writing about 
theory mechanisms in social science. His proposition was that paying attention to lower level 
mechanisms would result in a more ‘supple’ theory at the higher level. His definition of mechanisms 
is: 
 ‘1) a piece of scientific reasoning which is independently verifiable and gives rise to theoretical 
reasoning, 2) gives knowledge about a component process (generally one with units of analysis at a 
lower level) of another theory  (ordinarily a theory with units at a different ‘higher’ level) thereby 3) 
increasing the suppleness, complexity, elegance or believability of the theory at a higher level without 
                                                          
4 I am indebted to my colleague Olga Volkoff for this insight. 
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excessive multiplication of entities in that higher level theory 4) without doing too much violence (in 
the necessary simplification at the lower level to make the higher level go) to what we know as the 
main facts at the lower level’ p.367 
This description will be immediately be recognisable to grounded theorists as a description of 
theoretical coding, and the need to ground those theoretical codes at the lower level, while at the 
same time making sure that the level of abstraction holds. 
The figure below is offered as a summary of Glaser and Strauss’ vision of theory building, without 
compromising the original vision. For me the key insight of their approach is not that we extend the 
scope of the theory by sampling different groups, but that we are theoretically guided by category 
development as we do so. 
The x axis represents Conceptual Level, and the y axis Theory Scope. These are the two dimensions 
that are acted upon by following Glaser and Strauss’ guidance on theoretical sampling. The process 
of sampling similar or dissimilar groups extends the scope, but it is by paying attention to saturated 
and unsaturated concepts that the conceptual level of the theory, and its direction, is considered 
and worked on. 
Theory Scope 
 The starting point for theory building is a bounded context, where seed concepts are generated. 
These seed concepts might not even be empirically grounded, and little more than hunches 
(Urquhart, Lehmann et al. 2010). Substantive theories, which grounded theorists are very familiar 
with, pertain to the specific area being investigated, but the concepts generated in that theory exist 
independently of that data. Formal theories focus on conceptual entities. The scope of a theory is 
extended by sampling like and unlike groups, guided by concepts in the data.  The suggestion here 
too is that boundary conditions are specified for each level of theory. In grounded theory terms, 
these boundary conditions are represented by theoretical codes and the categories. The suggestion 
of this figure (and Davison and Martinsons (2016)) is that these conditions and contexts should be 





Figure 1 Theory Scope and Conceptual Level 
Conceptual Level  
When we first begin to code data, we inevitably code descriptively as it is necessary to explain the 
data to ourselves. As we begin to theorise about the data, and write theoretical memos, our 
concepts become more analytic, and less context dependent. The same applies to the relationships 
between concepts, where we have the challenge described by Stinchcombe (1991) of making sure 
the relationships we posit between concepts at the lower level also reside at the higher level. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It is clear from the discussion that Glaser and Strauss did indeed have clear and systematic 
recommendations for theory building from 1967 onwards. One problem seems to be that, because 
grounded theory is seen as producing rich, qualitative theories that are about micro phenomena, 
these recommendations seem not have permeated into the wider academic disciplines we work in. 
Layder’s critique (Layder 1998) about the hopelessly detailed nature of a grounded theory, it seems, 
has not been fully put to rest. It is easy to see why – the very nature of the grounded theory process 
means we start with a very detailed and inimate relationship with the data. This is both the strength 
and weakness of grounded theory. The scale of the task of building a grounded theory means that 
we often leave it to others to then take our theories, and either apply them to other contexts, or test 
them. One possible route is to take our substantive theories and widen their scope, but the 
emphasis on novelty, at least in my own discipline, seems to mean that once a substantive theory is 
published, it cannot be elaborated upon. 
That said, my observation of the newer disciplines I work with – management, information systems 
and software engineering – is that these disciplines often struggle with theory building, and the 
nature of theory. Unlike my sociologist colleagues, we are largely unfamiliar with the notion of 
mechanisms or how formal theories are used. Grounded theory offers clear and practical guidelines 
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on how a theory that applies to one area can be extended to another area, and also how the 
conceptual level of a theory can be pushed to levels of further abstraction. I would contend that 
newer disciplines can learn from the clarity and systematic nature of Glaser and Strauss’s 
recommendations, because, for those disciplines, advancing new and larger theories are important. 
There seems to be very little discussion of levels of theory in the newer disciplines – theory is either 
treated as universal, generally coming from other reference disciplines, and grounded theories are 
not considered as contributions to the overall theory building effort. Worse, we seem to lack the 
language to discuss theory and theoretical contribution. In information systems, Burton-Jones, 
McLean et al. (2014) make an excellent contribution to the IS theory debate when they suggests 
moving away from ideas of process/variance theories that are prominent in the discipline, towards 
conceptual latitude and fit, and focusing on constructs and relationships. As Davison and Martinsons 
(2016) suggest, it would also be helpful if people using and advancing theories considered the 
context in which they were created, and the context in which they are subsequently applied. 
Categorising the type of theoretical contribution could also be fruitful; for instance, Colquitt and 
Zapata-Phelan (2007) suggest that contributions can be categorised from those which introduce 
significant new concepts, examine new relationships and processes, to those that attempt to 
replicate theories. They then consider to what extent that contribution is grounded, empirically or 
theoretically (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan 2007). 
The division between grounded theorists and their colleagues will hopefully fade as the division 
between qualitative and quantitative research recedes. Often, the phenomena itself will demand a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research. We need to change policies via quantitative 
evidence, but before we do that, we need qualitative research into what people do. The advent of 
big data and the ubiquity of social media calls for both qualitative and quantitative research – 
understanding patterns in data requires a qualitative understanding of why people do what they do. 
For too long, in my opinion, Glaser and Strauss’ stellar contribution to understanding how we build 
theory, and how we scale up that theory, have been ignored by the mainstream of many of our 
academic disciplines. It is my sincere hope that this chapter contributes to interpreting the 
intentions of Glaser and Strauss’s advice on theoretical sampling. Glaser and Strauss represent is a 
huge intellectual contribution to theory building in the twentieth and twenty first centuries, and 
these ideas can and should help theory builders everywhere. 
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